Uncritical Portrayals of Fascist Italy and of Iberic-Latin Dictatorships in American Political Science

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Historians have documented extensively the fascination of many American intellectuals with the Soviet Union and fascist Italy during the 1920s and 1930s (Diggins 1966; 1972; Feuer 1962; Filene 1967; Warren 1993). They have also drawn a compelling analogy between the sympathetic attitudes of American intellectuals toward Soviet Russia and the sympathy of a later generation of intellectuals towards Cuba, China and North Vietnam (Skotheim 1971: 96–106; Hollander 1981; Caute 1988). However, little effort has been made to examine whether the forgiving attitudes toward fascist Italy might also have had a historical analogue in the form of forgiving attitudes toward other, non-communist, dictatorships.

The reason for this omission might be that fascism, unlike communism, had lost any respectability as a philosophy or self-descriptive identification. While numerous postwar regimes raised the red flag, not a single regime openly identified itself as fascist after the defeat of the Axis powers. Still, during the 1930s and early 1940s there emerged several dictators whose ideological sympathies lay with the fascist powers, yet who shrewdly avoided joining the Axis: Francisco Franco in Spain, Antonio Salazar in Portugal, Juan Peron in Argentina, and Getulio Vargas in Brazil. These dictators were strongly influenced by Italian fascism, but as the tide of the war turned against the Axis they abandoned their pro-fascist rhetoric and distanced their regimes from fascism. Might there be a resemblance between the portrayal of these Iberian and Latin American dictatorships by American intellectuals in the postwar years and the uncritical portrayal of Mussolini's Italy before World War II?

I explore this question here with regard to the discipline of political science

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in America. During the 1920s and 1930s some leading American political scientists considered Italian fascism a "striking experiment" (Merriam 1931a:9) whose unabashedly anti-democratic nature did not necessarily preclude learning from its more positive features; a chief aspect of the fascist "experiment" that fascinated these scholars was the corporate state. Other leading political scientists did not see in fascism potential lessons for America, but nonetheless regarded it as a viable modernizing force for a backward nation such as Italy. Similar attitudes can be seen in depictions of Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal, Peron's Argentina, and Vargas's Brazil by American political scientists in the 1960s and 1970s. Whereas in the 1950s political scientists tended to associate these regimes with fascism and totalitarianism, their image subsequently improved significantly. In part, this improvement reflected a resurgence of interest in "corporatism" within American political science. Some prominent scholars came to regard authoritarian corporatism as a "potentially viable (if unpleasant) mode of organizing a [backward] society's developmental efforts" (Malloy 1977:3). Other scholars went further, suggesting that Iberic-Latin corporatism "may offer lessons from which we [Americans] may learn" (Wiarda 1981:338). I aim to demonstrate that the characterizations of dictatorships in Latin America and/or the Iberian Peninsula by these scholars resembled their predecessors' uncritical characterizations of Mussolini's Italy.

A number of preliminary comments are in order before turning to the presentation of the historical material.

The tone of the academic writings cited below rarely echoed the vulgar pro-Mussolini pitch that characterized the popular discourse of the time (Diggins 1972). My claim is not that the authors of these texts were unalloyed fascists or that they favored the installation of dictatorship in America. Rather, I argue that these texts betrayed, under the guise of objectivity, a fascination with certain aspects of Italian fascism (with an eye toward emulating them in America) or an attitude condoning dictatorship in Italy, not America. By the same token, the later writings on Iberian or Latin corporatist dictatorships did not consist of all-out endorsements, but rather of subtle legitimations or naturalizations of dictatorship, disguised by the idiom of objective analysis.

I should stress that while my essay focuses on scholars, including prominent ones, who expressed uncritical attitudes toward fascism, other political scientists either registered unequivocal disapproval of fascism or, more typically, wrote nothing bearing on the issue. Similarly, the later rationalization of Iberic-Latin corporatist dictatorships was articulated by some leading scholars, but it was not universally shared. I do not claim that the views surveyed below represented the thinking of the majority of political scientists, but rather that these views constituted a respectable and legitimate voice within the polyphonic discourse of the discipline.

The focus of this essay is not on comparing regimes *per se*, but on comparing the portrayals of these regimes by two generations of American political

scientists. The important question of the actual similarity between fascism and, e.g., Peronism, is not addressed here. My aim is to show that the arguments and language used in the 1970s to differentiate authoritarianism and/or corporatism from fascism resembled the language and arguments employed earlier to distinguish between presumably-positive features of Mussolini's "experiment" (such as corporatism) and the less pleasant aspects of fascism. Similarly, arguments made in the 1970s about the natural compatibility between authoritarianism and Latin American political culture paralleled earlier arguments suggesting that Anglo-American parliamentary democracy did not comport well with the Italian national character.

THE ATTRACTION OF FASCISM

Background and Context

Prior to World War I, the discourse of American political science was dominated by the concept of "the state" (see Farr 1995). According to John W. Burgess, the discipline's leading theorist, the ideal state possessed sovereignty—namely "absolute, unlimited power over the individual subject and over all associations of subjects"—at the same time that its constitution provided the "only foundation and guaranty" of individual liberty (Burgess 1994:56–57).[1] Thus, the ideal state was at once orderly and free.

Burgess (1994:35–38) claimed that only the Teutonic nations, America included, possessed the "political psychology" and cultural heritage required for approximating the ideal state. The "Roman and Latin nations"—shaped by the legacy of the Roman Empire—had a gift for installing law and order, but lacked the Teutonic genius for reconciling order with liberty. Similarly, Woodrow Wilson (1889:580–81) wrote that the Romans ruled their empire "only by military force and the stern discipline of subordination," and that the English were fortunate to have inherited the "principle of representation" from the Teutons, rather than the autocratic legacy of the Romans.

The notion that liberal values were foreign to the "Roman" character would persist in the profession through the interwar period, and would inspire some of the rationalizations of Italian fascism discussed below. But the doctrine of the state declined rapidly in the aftermath of World War I (Gunnell 1995), in part due to its German origins (see Oren 1995). In the early 1920s the discourse of the state was eclipsed by lively discussions of "pluralism," the importance of "interest groups" in an increasingly complex industrial society, and the need to restructure political representation along functional economic lines (Barnes 1920; Coker 1921; Ellis 1920; 1923; Frankel 1922; Mott 1922; Sabine 1923; Tugwell 1921). Harold Laski was instrumental in acquainting American polit-

[1] The book was originally published in 1933 as an abridged version of Burgess's influential text (1890).

ical scientists with European theories of syndicalism and guild socialism, which regarded the state as "only one of the innumerable group units possessing corporate personality" (Shepard 1919:491). But although Laski easily persuaded his peers that the doctrine of state sovereignty was "an antiquated absolutism" (Shepard 1922:131), the syndicalist doctrines he advocated were apparently regarded as too extreme because of their uncompromising elevation of interest groups above central government, and their optimism regarding the ability of groups to live in harmony with each other under a minimalist central authority. Thus, the central tendency in political science in the 1920s can be described as a *qualified* acceptance of the logic of pluralism and its attendant emphasis on functional group representation. The qualification involved the recognition that Durkheimian solidarity, retention of "the state as the chief organ of society," and reliance on scientific experts would be necessary to cement society and mitigate intergroup conflict, especially between labor and capital (Barnes 1920:250).

A parallel intellectual tendency—stimulated by the wartime experience of public opinion manipulation and the wave of democratic regime breakdowns that swept the world shortly after the war—entailed a disillusionment with "democracy" (Purcell 1973:117; Ross 1991:ch. 10). The disillusionment produced an impulse to tame democracy by subjecting politics to scientific "control." Advocates of political control, most notably Charles Merriam of the University of Chicago, continued expressing unwavering support for "democracy," but such expressions glossed over an inherent tension between democratic mass participation and technocratic elite control.

Incidentally, it so happened that Italian fascism professed allegiance, in rhetoric at least, to ideals that, broadly speaking, were located down some of the same intellectual paths along which American political science was moving. Down the path of depreciative, realistic interpretations of constitutional values laid fascism's emphatic rejection of individual liberty—perhaps far down the path, but in that direction nonetheless.[2] Down the path of functional interest representation, one might curiously encounter Italian syndicalism and corporatism; down the path to social solidarity lay fervent nationalism, the hallmark of fascism[3]; and down the path of political control one might encounter an efficient bureaucracy in a one-party state. This is by no means to say that an intellectual drift down those paths was inevitable. There were certainly political scientists who broadly subscribed to the emerging qualified pluralism and/

[2] Indeed, as will be shown below, Charles Beard—who pioneered the attack on the formal sanctity of the constitution (1913)—had a short but intense flirtation with fascism in the late 1920s.

[3] This potential "slide" was noted by a contemporaneous critique of Durkheim's sociology: "out of the gospel of social determinism which exalted the group or 'society,' and minimized the importance of the individual, there evolved a conception of the nation which foreshadowed some of the principal doctrines of the Militant Action Francaise, of the Italian Fascists, of the Russian Bolshevists, and of 'one hundred per-cent' Americanism" (Mitchell 1931:88).

or social control, and yet displayed no sympathy for any aspect of fascism.[4] Still, the new theoretical trends combined with older, negative stereotypes of Italian political culture to produce an intellectual climate in which forgiving attitudes towards fascism were respectable.

In the 1930s, this intellectual climate was reinforced by two new developments. First, the Great Depression prompted many Americans to take a dim view of their institutions, and to take a keener interest in more vibrant foreign models. The appeal of fascist corporatism in America was enhanced by the contrast between the ostensible vitality of the Italian economy in the early 1930s and the moribund economic conditions in the United States. The second development that, somewhat paradoxically, facilitated a forgiving attitude toward Italian fascism was Hitler's rise to power. Although the Nazi takeover, on the one hand, tarnished the overall image of fascism, on the other hand it set a new benchmark of racism and brutality that made the Italian regime appear relatively tame. R. Taylor Cole, a political scientist who conducted research in Nazi Germany, recollected that when he traveled from Germany to Italy he felt that he "was moving into another world. There were many excesses and abuses under Italian Fascism, but there was a much freer atmosphere there than in Nazi Germany" (Bear et al. 1991:74). The attenuating effect of Nazi brutality on the evaluation of Italian fascism is exemplified in the book *Fascism and National Socialism*, by Columbia University historian Michael Florinsky (1936). In Florinsky's book, a reviewer observed in the American Political Science Review (APSR), "always the fascist lily is gilded while the Swastika comes out somewhat stained. Granting that the excessive anti-Semitism of the Third Reich has no Roman counterpart, it would still seem that Florinsky's penchant is distinctly toward Rome" (Graham 1937:585). Thus, the fact that Italy was eclipsed by Germany as a paradigm of fascist ruthlessness may help to explain why some scholars continued to portray Italy uncritically even after 1933.

Mussolini To the Rescue: Normalizing Fascist Dictatorship

In 1918 the Rome bureau of the American Committee on Public Information—headed by political scientist Charles Merriam—depicted Italy as "a modern and progressive democracy" that could assist America in spreading Wilsonian ideals ("Italy's Political Recognition." Merriam Papers, box 10, folder 5. References to this collection below are abbreviated "MP," followed by box/folder numbers). But the optimism evident in this wartime report was soon dampened by the "wave" of democratic regime breakdowns that began in Italy in 1922 and spread across Europe and Latin America (Huntington 1991:17–18). Against the backdrop of democratic retreat, "believers in democracy" came under sharp

[4] For example, Francis Coker of Yale University, who helped shape the emerging qualified pluralism in the early 1920s, sharply denounced fascism in his textbook (1934) in a way that could have served as a model for other writers.

criticism for "too often assum[ing] that it is a universal kind of government for all times and places . . . that it is something to which all people have a 'right' irrespective of their equipment for it" (Dickinson 1930:287). Applied to Italy, this criticism implied that the fascist dictatorship should not be judged by American norms, and that Mussolini's regime could be made more "normal" (for Italy, at least) if pre-fascist Italian politics were characterized in terms bleaker than "modern progressive democracy." This is precisely what some political scientists did. They argued that elected governments in prewar Italy were essentially dictatorial, that postwar conditions "required" (Clough 1932:302) authoritarian action to "save" (Schneider 1928:79) Italy from Bolshevik-incited chaos, and that after seizing power the fascists were "forced" by the opposition to abandon parliamentarism (Schneider and Clough 1929:140).

To a considerable extent, the "normalizing" of fascism was rooted in the view—inherited from an earlier generation of political scientists—that the Italian "national psychology" (Spencer 1932:18) differed markedly from the American one. A condescending view of Italian political traits was articulated most conspicuously by Henry Russell Spencer of Ohio State University, probably the profession's foremost expert on Italian politics at the time of Mussolini's coup (later elected president of the American Political Science Association [APSA]). The Italians, Spencer wrote (1932:18–19), were "socially indifferent, unquestioning" by nature; they were "passive subjects rather than active citizens [who] seem sufficiently happy and contented, unwilling to disturb any regime, democratic or despotic, if only 'si lavora e si mangia.'" Thus, the Italian people lacked the "spirit" essential for the practice of Anglo-American democracy (Spencer 1927:550).

Other political scientists expressed similar views. Francis Wilson, a prominent political theorist at the University of Washington, wrote that authoritarianism was "more suited to the long Italian tradition of government than the liberal system." The 1848 constitution and the English-style parliamentary system adopted by Italy "were exotic plants that were not destined to flourish in the new environment" (Wilson 1936:615). Frederic Ogg of the University of Wisconsin (longtime editor of the APSR and later president of the APSA) approvingly quoted Spencer's depiction of the Italians as "passive subjects;" he added that democracy in Italy "was a tender plant" imported "prematurely" by a nation "ill-prepared by experience, education, and temperament" (1936:808). And William B. Munro, a Harvard professor and former APSA president, noted that "although the Italians borrowed the frame of English government, they had not acquired either the tradition nor the spirit of it" (1931:692).

Henry Spencer and other authors portrayed Italian elected leaders as corrupt bosses and virtual dictators. In pre-fascist Italy, "statesmanship was reduced to the exercise of veiled dictatorship" (Ogg 1936:821). Prime Minister Giolliti was a selfish "opportunist" who "professed democratic sentiment but did not have any fixed political principle" (Munro 1931:684). His "long dictatorship

(1903–14), veiled under parliamentary forms . . . prepared Italy for accepting that of Mussolini" (Spencer 1929:141). The Parliament "was always starting and stopping, never arriving at the solution of problems" (Spencer 1927:540), and its "degenerate" leaders were given to "prostitution of [their] parliamentary powers." (Spencer 1932:99).

Contemporaneous political scientists not only rationalized fascist authoritarianism as conforming to the normal pattern of the Italian past; in one important respect they characterized it as an *improvement* over the past. The fascists, some scholars maintained, brought an end to the disorder which gripped Italy after the war, and their regime saved Italy from the greater evil of Bolshevik tyranny.

Popular textbooks told the story of the fascist seizure of power in more or less the following way. "The meteoric rise of fascism," wrote Ogg (1936:824), "must be viewed in the setting of chaotic Italian post-war conditions." The Italian people "were in a disillusioned and resentful mood because Italy seemed to have profited so little from the war" (Munro 1931:685). The Italian economy was "paralyzed"; "Debts were enormous, deficits piling up . . . unemployment was mounting" (Ogg 1936:824). Quick to capitalize on the situation were the socialists who, upon "orders from Russia," used "direct action methods [to] capture the government of commune after commune" (Ogg 1936:824–5). In rural areas "Bolshevik" groups imposed a "veritable tyranny," and in industrial centers they fomented a "strike and lockout mania." The communists engaged in "semi-systematic sabotaging of bourgeois civilization." "Coercion by force of arms" was necessary, but "this the government dared not try . . . The challenge was taken up by the fascists . . . [who] found a cause and made themselves popular with the plain citizen by espousing it and showing ardent energy in its prosecution." In sum, fascist black shirts "sav[ed] society from its destroyers" (Spencer 1932:75, 77).

Exiled opponents of Mussolini contested the claim that fascism "saved" Italy from Bolshevism, pointing out that the communist danger had already passed when the fascists marched on Rome. But in the 1920s political scientists considered this argument "not very convincing" (Sait 1927:669). The communists might have been past their peak in 1922, Sait (1927:669) conceded, but "whatever the real situation may have been, the people did believe in the existence of a Red peril." In 1936, a writer in the APSR remarked happily that the exiles' version of the story had become "now standard" (Zurcher 1936:990). But the remark was somewhat premature, for some scholars clung to the "fascism to the rescue" thesis even in 1936–37. Ogg (1936:825) claimed that although Communist influence within the Socialist party declined in 1921, many people still "believe[d] a Bolshevist *coup* to be only a question of time." Fascism "was a patriotic reaction to the unpatriotic and revolutionary influence of the communists and socialists," wrote Wilson (1936:635). And Herbert Schneider (1937:427) contended that communism "has set the emotional stage for fascism."

Some discussions of the rise of fascism played down fascist violence. Nicholas Murray Butler (1926), president of Columbia University, described the fascist "revolution" as "silent and bloodless." Norman Hill and Harold Stoke (1935:466) of the University of Nebraska also characterized the fascist revolution as "bloodless." John Heinberg (1937:60–62) of the University of Missouri portrayed the "famous" March on Rome as a "relatively tame affair," which had a "tremendous" psychological effect on an "enthusiastic" populace. Schneider (1928:45) wrote that the Red "parades and demonstrations usually ended up in general beatings . . . and occasional shots being fired," but that "on the whole . . . these 'bloody battles' and 'massacres' . . . really turn out on close examination to be nine tenths noise." And Spencer (1932:84) likened the "irresponsible" fascist methods to the "manner of the English suffragettes in 1912."

After "com[ing] to the rescue" of Italy, the fascists set up an electoral system favorable to them in 1923, which Munro (1931:686) described as a "unique . . . interesting experiment in the art of government." Blame for the subsequent hardening of the dictatorship was placed on the opposition as much as on Mussolini himself. The parliamentary opposition was "sullen and irreconcilable . . . determined to provide the majority with every ounce of trouble that they could manufacture" (Munro 1931:702–3). The opposition's criticism was "sterile, negative," and "it was obvious that they could not conceivably present to the country a concrete alternative to Mussolini" (Spencer 1932:109). Matteotti and Amendola—socialist leaders murdered by the fascists—were "old fashioned" (read: unscrupulous) and "particularly irritating" politicians (Schneider 1928:83). In short, "from 1924 to 1926 Fascism was *forced* by opponents, scandal and intrigue to . . . stamp out all opposition" (Schneider and Clough 1929:140; emphasis added).

The Lure of Corporatism

Descriptions of Italian fascism as an "experiment" were common in the political science literature of the interwar period (e.g., Hill and Stoke 1935:v; Wilson 1936:611). This word was often prefaced by positive adjectives: "amazing experiment" (Charles Beard 1929:278); "striking experiment" (Merriam 1931a:ix); "great experiment" (Ogg 1936:809); "unique experiment" (Schneider and Clough 1929:199); a "vital and vivid experiment in social control" (Buell 1929:363).

Of all aspects of the fascist "experiment," corporatism appeared to fascinate American scholars the most. According to Henry Spencer (1932:249), the "proudest boast" of fascism was that its corporate state was "solving the world-wide puzzle, how capital and labor may be led out of their sterile, destructive struggle for mastery at the nation's expense, to social integration, to orderly working side by side in the nation's economic effort." Although Spencer himself was not impressed by this boast (for he regarded fascism as fit for back-

ward Italy more than as a model for the industrialized world), other scholars took the corporate state seriously, not least of them Herbert Wallace Schneider.

Schneider, one of John Dewey's "closest" students (Lamprecht to Schneider, 24 February 1924, Schneider Papers), became a chief interpreter of fascism to American social scientists, before acquiring a name as a historian of philosophy and religion at Columbia University. Schneider's research in Italy in 1926–27 was funded by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), whose chairman, Charles Merriam, displayed a "kindly interest" in the research and the publication of the resulting book—the much-cited *Making the Fascist State* (1928:v; Merriam to Schneider, 11 October 1927 and Schneider to Merriam, 3 January 1928, MP 39/15; Merriam to Schneider, 13 December 1927, Schneider Papers).

Schneider (1927:161; 1928:151–64) reported that "in theory Fascism has already given place to syndicalism," and offered an uncritical review of the new theory: with Marxism it shared the rejection of liberal atomism as well as the belief that functional economic interest provided the cement of human association; yet in contrast to Marxism, fascist syndicalism maintained that the struggle among nations was paramount to the class struggle, and that the state had to organize economic classes and bring them to resolve their conflict peacefully in the common interest of national competitiveness.[5]

Schneider further reported that the "illegalism" of the past had given way to "a revolutionary experiment in constitution-making":

> [T]he politics of dictatorship . . . are gradually giving ground to the "economic organization of producers," the legal and judicial recognition of syndicates, the organization of national corporations, and finally, the talk about "organic representation" and a syndicalist parliament. The "Fascist state" is being enlarged into the "corporate state" . . . the fact is clear that the emphasis is rapidly shifting from the *fasci* and the militia to the national hierarchy of syndicalist associations as the foundations of the "Fascist" regime and the essence of the Fascist revolution (1927:161–63, 201).

Schneider recounted uncritically the fascist claims that the liberal parliamentary state was out of step with modern industrial conditions. Modern society "demands a modern up-to-date state," under which economic and social groups are "incorporated into a cultural whole." Italy was forced by her dire situation to lead the quest for the modern coordinative order; and her revolution, Schneider quoted the fascists, signals "but the beginning of a transformation of European politics" (Schneider 1928:112–13). As Diggins (1972:226) observed, Schneider essentially interpreted Mussolini's corporate state as a pioneering bid to realize the Durkheimian dream of social solidarity.[6]

[5] *Political Science Quarterly* (PSQ) published a similar comparison between fascist and socialist doctrines by a leading fascist theorist. (Gini 1927:104).

[6] Schneider continued to regard Italian corporatism favorably in the 1930s. His writings earned him the "esteem" of the Italian government, as well as an invitation to serve as a visiting professor in Rome (Misscitelli to Haskell, 22 November 1934; Tullio Gianetti [President of the Fascist Federation of Industrial Labor] to Schneider, 23 April 1937, Schneider Papers).

William Y. Elliott of Harvard University—the profession's earliest and harshest critic of fascism—commented that "Schneider's analysis would hardly suggest what appears to be the fact, that the syndicates are under completely centralized Fascist control" (1929). He criticized Schneider for ignoring fascism's exiled critics, and for making "few revelations which have not been made by Mussolini or other Fascist apologists." But in 1929 Elliott's unequivocal anti-fascism was rather unusual, and some of his senior contemporaries were more charitable toward *Making the Fascist State*. Charles Merriam wrote to Schneider that he "found [the book] extremely useful and stimulative" (26 July 1929, MP 39/15), and he reviewed the book favorably in the *Journal of Political Economy* (Merriam 1931b).

Charles Beard (1929), the eminent historian and former president of the APSA, "enthusiastically questioned" Schneider about his experience in Italy (Diggins 1972:266), and then applauded Schneider's "realistic and highly important survey of Fascism." Beard praised the fascists for their "original" achievement: bringing about "by force of the State the most compact and unified organization of capitalists and laborers into two camps which the world has ever seen," an organization that allowed labor to make "decided gains." Beard further wrote that

> the dictatorship is not all under his [Mussolini's] hat. The powerful corporations of industry and labor are to some extent representative; the employers' corporations are autonomous and the labor unions, though strictly centralized under the bureaucracy are in theory representative in management. For the political parliament just abolished is to be substituted a kind of "economic" parliament, indirectly elected . . . This is far from the frozen dictatorship of the Russian Tsardom; it is more like the American check and balance system; and it may work out in a new democratic direction . . . Beyond question, an amazing experiment is being made here, an experiment in reconciling individualism and socialism, politics and technology. It would be a mistake to allow feelings aroused by contemplating the harsh deeds and extravagant assertions that have accompanied the Fascist process (as all other immense historical changes) to obscure the potentialities and the lessons of the adventure.

Beard's enthusiasm for the corporate state was short-lived. In general, though, the onset of the depression only heightened Americans' curiosity about Italian corporatism as an alternative to the politico-economic status quo, especially in light of the previously mentioned fact that the Italian economy appeared to perform comparatively well during the depression's early years (Brinkley 1995:39).

As economic crisis deepened a pessimistic sentiment was widely setting in, that "democracy is on the rocks in the United States as well as elsewhere" (Norlin 1934:vi; see Purcell 1973:126–27). This pessimism led some to conclude that democracy must adopt features of autocracy in order to survive. For example, one scholar argued that to "save" its ailing democratic institutions Sweden must "imitate before it is too late the virtues—though not the faults—of their [fascist] opposite" (Sandelius 1934:371). And William F. Willoughby, a

former president of the APSA, urged Americans to "make a searching examination" of the revolutionary institutions erected in Russia, Italy, and Germany, "apart from the abuses as may be practiced under them," with an eye toward "the possible incorporation in popular government of the advantages of autocracy" (1936:vi, 111).

For Willoughby, autocracy's chief "advantage" was its administrative efficiency, but other scholars saw corporatism as the main feature of fascism to which democracy should draw closer. In a very subtle way, this point was made by E. Pendleton Herring of Harvard (later a president of the APSA and chairman of the SSRC). Herring (1930) saw Italy and the United States as occupying "two extreme positions." On one extreme was an "organic state, wherein groups are integers and individuals nothing," and where interest groups were formally recognized yet denied "substance." On the other hand, America clung to outdated individualism, "neglect[ing] the interests binding men together"; in America groups may have had substance but no formal recognition by the state. "Both situations leave much to be desired," Herring concluded, implying that the ideal polity was situated somewhere between the Italian and American poles.

Other scholars were blunter than Herring. George Norlin (1934:39–40), president of the University of Colorado, wrote that fascism "has its good points—its virtues. It seeks to wipe out individual and factional strife and merge all classes in the solidarity of the nation. It is, in the Aristotelian phrase, vicious only in its excesses . . . The Germans have revolted against the excesses of individualism and so have we." Norlin hoped that America would continue to evolve toward a "golden mean" between fascist nationalism and "ragged" individualism. William Welk, an SSRC-funded economist at the University of St. Thomas, wrote that "the social and economic experiment attempted in Italy presents certain interesting parallels to that now being tried in the United States under the aegis of the NRA. Cooperation through authority appears to be the formula common to both programs." The corporate state was an "example" of how a "freely chosen national economic elite . . . inspired by new ideals of social right and social justice, is ready and able to limit . . . the freedom of the one in the interest of the many" (Welk 1933:98, 109). Hill and Stoke (1935:495) also likened Mussolini's corporative program to the Nazi labor code and the New Deal's National Recovery Administration, depicting them as "schemes designed to assure economic peace and justice, and to provide economic planning."

Interest in fascist corporatism persisted even after it turned out that Italy's economy was sinking. Of four scholarly books about Italian fascism that appeared in 1938, only one, by Carl Schmidt of Columbia University, was unequivocally critical. Welk (1938) clung to his analogy between fascism and the New Deal, and although he concluded that Italy's economic progress would depend upon the return of democracy, a critic rightly found it "hard to see that

such a conclusion flows out of the study itself" (Schmidt 1939:295). And H. Arthur Steiner of UCLA, though he too expressed hope that fascism would give way to democracy, credited fascism with having "performed the historical function of precipitating a solution of the crisis everywhere apparent in the border line of politics and economics." "Democracy should learn," Steiner wrote, "on the basis of the extreme example of Fascism, how to reconcile individual liberty with the regulation and control of social affairs necessitated by the general welfare . . . democracy may yet, with authoritarian examples before it, crown with success its search for a compatible twentieth-century standard of political and economic obligation" (Steiner 1938:141). One reviewer called this insight "intelligent" (Langsam 1939:308), and Fritz Morstein Marx of Harvard University praised Steiner's "outstanding contribution" (Steiner 1938:Foreword).[7]

Fascist Civic Training

Charles Merriam returned from his service as chief U.S. propagandist in Italy with a clear sense that techniques of "publicity"—the controlled dissemination of ideas and manipulation of popular symbols—might be used effectively for the purpose of fostering civic solidarity (Merriam 1919; Ross 1991:454). The problem of nation-building ("civic education" in Merriam's terms) was indeed at the center of his research agenda between approximately 1925 and 1931. It was this intellectual concern that aroused Merriam's interest in Herbert Schneider's interpretation of fascism as a non-Marxist solution to the problem of the fragmentation of industrial society.

Merriam—the most influential political scientist of his generation—characteristically framed nation-building as a "control problem" (Merriam to Paul Kosok, 5 April 1927, MP 33/15). How could social science contribute to strengthening national cohesion in America, beset as it was by increasing ethnic, religious, regional, and economic diversity? Merriam launched a massive cross-national research project on "comparative civic training." He instructed project participants to assess the extent to which public schools, patriotic organizations, the press, patriotic symbols, etc. served as effective "mechanisms or devices for the purpose of inculcating civic interest and loyalty" (Merriam to Clough, 9 April 1928, MP 37/12).

The countries Merriam chose to study included "two of the more modern systems, the Fascist in Italy and the Soviet system in Russia" (Merriam's remarks to SSRC conference, 151, MP 139/1). These two "striking experiments" were selected because they were "the most interesting [attempts] now in process" of "creating de novo a type of political loyalty to, and interest in, a new order of things. The revolution in Russia was, of course, much more fundamental . . . but the Italian situation is equally remarkable" (Merriam to Schneider, 23 December 1927, MP 39/15; Merriam to Clough, 9 April 1928, MP 37/12).

[7] The third 1938 book that treated fascism uncritically was authored by G. Lowell Field.

Making Fascists, by Herbert Schneider and Shepard Clough (1929), a young historian at Columbia University, was among the top-selling volumes in Merriam's series on civic training (Donald Bean to Merriam, 7 April 1938, MP 58/3; Clough 1981:75). Schneider and Clough found that "the Fascist regime has made an enormous advance over its immediate predecessors in appealing to the religious imagination of the people and in providing the nation with concrete symbols and forms for the expression of its political faith" (203–4). Fascist "rites and rituals" such as "the black uniforms, the black pennant, the Roman salute . . . may seem artificial and even unreal to a foreigner," but "even a casual acquaintance with the spirit and inner life of a *fascio* is enough to reveal the emotional appeal and imaginative force which all this exerts on the youth of the nation . . . There is a considerable and undeniable element of religious conviction and devotion in most Fascists, which transcends the limits of political strife and party tactics" (74–75). The black-shirted militia was "the most striking" of the special corps which contributed to the nation's "picturesque character" (119). The militia was "purified" of its violent elements, becoming a "premilitary training school of national service," whose members engaged in useful public works (122–33). The authors concluded by suggesting that the "methods and ideals of civic training" employed by the fascists to meet Italy's postwar emergency "may serve to instruct those peoples who have as yet evaded such emergencies" (204).

Charles Merriam apparently had no problem with this suggestion. He told Schneider and Clough that he was "greatly pleased" with their "ground-breaking" study (Merriam to Schneider, 27 February 1929, MP 39/15). In *The Making of Citizens* (1931), the book in which he synthesized the findings of the civic training series, Merriam expressed optimism about the contemporary "scientific tendency" away from the "dogmatisms" of the past toward modern social control. In this transition, the resort to fear and force as "bases of civic allegiance" was giving way to new scientific techniques of "civic education as means of political control" (349). Merriam acknowledged that Mussolini ruled with a firm "iron hand" (224), but he nonetheless regarded fascism as a full-fledged participant in the progressive march toward the end of scientific political control. In fact, Italy and Russia had progressed the furthest in the manipulation of symbols for fostering civic loyalty. Along the path to modernity

> Symbolism earlier associated with the pomp and ceremony of the *ancien regime* loses strength, but new types appear and become impressive factors in the new regime, as is seen with especial brilliance in Italy and Russia. Builders of political morale in old states or in new will without doubt continue to employ these methods in the development of political loyalty and enthusiasm, and will find them useful in the task of magnetizing the elements of the state (349).

It was easily possible, wrote Merriam, that the "brilliant devices of the Reds and the Black Shirts, with their array of colorful and inspiring cults and ceremonies," would be "woven into the civic education of the future" throughout the modern world (310).

In sum, although Charles Merriam disapproved of fascist dictatorship, he was curious about certain aspects of the fascist "experiment," and he was perfectly open to the possibility of emulating fascist techniques in America. As Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1956:325) later observed, Merriam apparently considered "the 'making of fascists' and the 'making of citizens' [as] essentially the same kind of undertaking."

Other "Achievements" of Fascism

In addition to pioneering the corporate state, Italian fascism was credited with other "very real and substantial achievements" (Spencer 1927:542). Impressed with such achievements were both scholars who, like Henry Spencer, regarded fascism as fit for the "passive" Italians alone, and scholars such as H. Arthur Steiner, who regarded aspects of fascism as "examples" for the industrialized world.

Spencer (1932:103) praised the fascists for improving "the general condition of society" after taking power. "Order had been established, though at the expense of the Constitution and of law . . . Instead of every man doing that which was right in his own eyes, there were discipline, authority, orderliness . . . the trains and trams came and went punctually, the streets . . . became relatively clean and clear of beggars." Public life, "by contagion from Mussolini," had become more "energetic," and the state began "marching with quicker, manlier step."

Steiner (1938:137) wrote that fascism effected "wholesome improvements in the Italian scene." Mussolini's boast that "fascist social legislation is the most advanced in the world . . . contains a kernel of truth." The regime "maintains an elaborate system of social insurance, health resorts for young and old, a program of slum clearance, and a large scale program of public works to allay unemployment" (1938:32–33). Steiner also praised the fascists for their "constitutional" ingenuity. Italian jurists devised a better solution than their Russian or German counterparts to the problem of defining the constitutional relationship between the party and the state. Furthermore, Fascist jurists successfully laid "the constitutional and mechanical basis for [the] permanence" of the fascist regime. Thanks to their efforts, "the Fascist dispensation will not necessarily pass with the passing of the figure who created it" (1937:229, 242).

Ogg (1936:842) noted the "great [economic] gains" made by Mussolini's regime. The fascists put Italians "back to work" and gave them a "rather substantial degree of national prosperity . . . amid an era of worldwide depression." (Such gains were purchased at the price of lost personal freedom, acknowledged Ogg, but he depicted the accusations of the émigrés' opposition in that regard as exaggerated [842]). The fascists balanced the budget and "steered Italy out of a financial mess which seemed hopeless," wrote Munro (1931:726). Italy's finances were sound, wrote Hill and Stoke (1935:493–94), quoting *Fortune* magazine, because of the "vigorous" stewardship of Mussolini; the peo-

ple's "hot faith" in their leader and their "patriotic fervor" were "the psychological factors that to a large measure determine the credit of any nation. And in Italy they are strikingly favorable."

The fascists won praise for turning the Italian public bureaucracy into a model of "Napoleonic efficiency" (Ogg 1936:842). Lester Born (1927:870–71) wrote that in reviving the undemocratic but "efficacious" *podesta* system of local administration, "Premier Mussolini has once more appealed to the vigorous heritage of early Italy to carry on his modern revivification and unification." Taylor Cole (1938) described how the fascists successfully "simplified and refined" the organization of the civil service. Cole (later an APSA president) commended the fascist regime for allowing government personnel to form syndical unions: "In few countries have the problems of administrative syndicalism been more decisively solved" (1157). Even the fascist party itself, remarked Harold Lasswell and Renzo Sereno (1937), was gradually becoming a "true bureaucracy" that was recruiting increasingly educated personnel, sometimes through "rigid competitive examinations." True, the original party personnel typically "distinguished themselves" by engaging in "informal violence," but presently "civil administration tasks absorb most of their energies." The Lasswell-Sereno study illustrates the use of antiseptic language to describe the less pleasant aspects of Italian fascism. The term "dictatorship" was entirely absent from the article; fascist party organs were dubbed "public law agencies," and the parliament was classified as a "declining" agency, as if its decline was a mere secular trend.

THE ATTRACTION OF AUTHORITARIANISM AND CORPORATISM

Background and Context

The late 1930s was aptly characterized as a period of "fascist vertigo" (Payne 1987:632). Fascism momentarily appeared to be the wave of the future, whereas the prospects for liberal democracy appeared gloomy even to its defenders, let alone to dictators (or aspiring dictators), who detested it to begin with. Francisco Franco declared that his state would be structured in the mold of Germany and Italy, modified to fit Spain's national characteristics (Gleason 1995:29). Indeed, "from 1937 to 1945 the Franco regime was doctrinally at least a semi-fascist state" (Payne 1987:629). Antonio Salazar's "corporative republic" was not originally inspired by the Italian model, but after 1936 it "participated in the general tendency toward fascism" in southern and eastern Europe (Payne 1987:633). In 1937, Getulio Vargas "launched his Estado Novo (New State) regime as the Brazilian version of European fascism and corporativism"; Vargas's constitution was "faithfully copied after European fascist charters" (Szulc 1959:26–27). Juan Peron experienced the fascist vertigo as Argentina's military attaché in Rome, and joined Italian combat regiments during the early stages of the war (Szulc 1959:109).

Notwithstanding their pro-fascist sentiments, these dictators had the good political sense to abstain from joining the Axis. Salazar "was not as opposed to the Rome-Berlin Axis as he preferred to have it appear after 1943" (Payne 1987:631), but he nevertheless maintained Portugal's official neutrality, as did Franco in Spain. Vargas declared in June 1941 that the Western democracies were "anachronisms," but later threw his support behind them. Peron and fellow officers sought to align Argentina with the Axis, but after seizing power in 1943 they expediently refrained from translating their pro-Axis views into a formal alliance (Szulc:84, 110–13).

Stanley Payne surmised that "Had Hitler won the war, there seems little doubt that Franquism would have become . . . more radical and overtly fascist in form." Salazar's regime too "would probably have become . . . more fascist" (1987:629, 632). But as it turned out fascism lost the war, and those dictators who were influenced by fascism hastened to dissociate their regimes from it. Still, in the 1950s American social scientists often continued to identify these regimes as fascist. Friedrich and Brzezinski, in their classic statement of the totalitarian model (1956), described Peron as a "fascist leader" (24), Peron's regime as "budding totalitarianism" (139), and Peron's *justicialismo* as a "vulgarization of Fascist corporatism" (86). Seymour Martin Lipset (1960:176) depicted Peronism and "Getulisme" (Vargas) as "fascism of the left."[8] In his famous textbook, economist Paul Samuelson (1955:728) surveyed the common characteristics of fascist regimes, "whether in Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy, Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal, or Peron's Argentina." And William Ebenstein (1954) of Princeton University wrote in his popular textbook that "fascism is now firmly entrenched" in Spain (78), and that Peron's Argentina was a "full-fledged fascist state" (82). He also identified the Salazar and Vargas dictatorships as fascist (77). Ebenstein stated that "What the one-party state with the secret police and concentration camps is to the political side of fascist regimes, corporatism is to fascism's social and economic aspects" (74).

But during the 1960s and 1970s, the reputation of these regimes underwent a rehabilitation of sorts. The fascist origins of Francoism were blurred, and Spain became a model "authoritarian" regime, characterized by "limited pluralism." Peronism and "Getulisme" came to epitomize, in the eyes of some political scientists, progressive "corporatist" regimes, which offered a viable model for other developing nations, and from which even Americans might have something to learn. In part, the revision corresponded to objective political change—Franco's dictatorship, for example, mellowed over time and shed its overtly fascistic forms (Payne 1987). But the change also reflected intellectual trends within American political science and developments external to the discipline that were remarkably similar to the trends of the 1920s and 1930s: dis-

[8] Lipset (1960:130) classified Franco and Salazar as "right extremists" rather than "fascists" of the right.

comfort with unregulated interest-group pluralism, pessimism about the future of liberal democracy, and the emergence of harsher dictatorships in Latin America that made past dictatorships appear tame in comparison.

As noted above, American political scientists came to accept the reality of interest-group politics somewhat reluctantly in the 1920s, feeling that a powerful state authority would be necessary to regulate group competition and prevent parochial interests from gaining undue influence. The suspicion toward unregulated pluralistic politics abated in the 1950s when classics such as Truman (1951) and Dahl (1956) represented pluralism in unqualifiedly positive terms, and when "the state" disappeared from disciplinary discourse. But in the late 1960s the old anxieties began resurfacing, and pluralism—though it remained the dominant paradigm of American political science—came under attack from scholars who sought to rein in "special" interests and "bring the state back in" as an autonomous actor serving the public good.[9] This intellectual mood facilitated a revival of interest in the "corporatist" mode of interest-representation.

Another aspect of the intellectual climate of the 1960s and 1970s that reproduced the mood of earlier years was anxiety about the prospects of liberal democracy, stimulated by another "wave" of democratic reversals. As Samuel Huntington (1991:21) observed (alluding in part to his own work), the global swing away from democracy in the 1960s and early 1970s produced "pessimism about the applicability of democracy in developing countries and . . . concern about the viability and workability of democracy among the developed countries." While since the early 1980s political scientists have been busily writing about transitions to democracy, one should not forget that a short time earlier they were still grappling with "the breakdown of democratic regimes" (Linz and Stepan 1978), and that they altogether failed to anticipate the "third wave of democratization" that began in the Iberian peninsula in the mid-1970s (as Huntington 1991:319 candidly admitted).

Critical attitudes toward the Peron and Vargas dictatorships diminished further as a result of the rise of harsher military dictatorships in Argentina and Brazil in the 1960s. The latter regimes were classified as "bureaucratic-authoritarian" (O'Donnell 1973), and were differentiated from the "populist" authoritarianism of Vargas and Peron (Collier and Collier 1977:503). This distinction was justified on analytical grounds (bureaucratic authoritarianism excluded the working classes while populism incorporated them), but it also implied a normative evaluation of Vargas and Peron's dictatorships as better, or less bad, than their successors. Overall, the norms of repression set by the new dictatorships seem to have attenuated criticism of their predecessors (or of less repressive

[9] See, e.g., Evans et al. (1985), Krueger (1974), and Olson (1982). I cite these sources as examples of broad intellectual trends in the discipline, *not* as examples of uncritical attitudes toward dictatorship.

contemporaneous juntas such as General Velasco's in Peru) in a manner similar to the effect of Nazi brutality on the evaluation of Mussolini's Italy.

"An Authoritarian Regime: Spain"

Juan Linz arrived at Columbia University from Spain in 1950. Initially, his fellow students and professors regarded him with suspicion because Linz did not identify with the Spanish Loyalists, whom he preferred to label "reds." Linz soon learned to use more "correct" terminology, and he went on to become one of the leading political sociologists of the postwar era (Lipset 1995:3–4). Much of Linz's reputation was built upon an influential article (1964) that criticized the then-prevalent classification of regimes into either democratic or totalitarian types, and which used the case of Spain to develop a third, "authoritarian" type (Linz also classified Vargas and Salazar as authoritarian rulers). Unlike totalitarian political systems, Linz wrote, authoritarian systems are pluralistic, but their pluralism is "limited, not responsible" (297).

Linz insisted that as a social scientist he should not express value judgments (338), and the tone of his article was indeed objective. Nevertheless, the piece is open to interpretation as a subtle defense of the Franco regime. Although Linz warned that "we may be seriously misled if we study such regimes through constitutions, laws, speeches," (291) he relied substantially on the words of Franco and his confidantes to support his argument. For example, Linz quoted approvingly from a 1947 text written by Franco's brother-in-law, Ramon Serrano-Suner, declaring that "in Spain there has never been anything that would really look like a totalitarian state" (299). Linz did not mention that in 1940 Serrano-Suner drafted a law proclaiming the state to be a "totalitarian instrument," that Serrano-Suner was even more pro-fascist than Franco himself, and that the regime executed at least twenty-eight thousand Spaniards shortly before his 1947 declaration (Payne 1987:285, 259, 223). While Franco's speeches were taken by Linz at face value, he discounted the charges made by Franco's exiled victims. Quoting a foreign observer of Spain, Linz wrote that "The picture of Franco's Spain that is firmly believed by the exiles is distorted and in many respects false. They picture a totalitarian police state that simply does not exist. They have no idea of the degree of tolerance that Franco permits so long as his position and the security of his regime is not threatened" (316).

Linz played down the repressive nature of Francoism by indicating that even democratic regimes may apply "terror" during "crisis situations." He wrote that the Spanish media enjoyed some autonomy and—again violating his own stricture against taking formal laws seriously—that "as long as one does not make more than 5 copies of one's opinion, one cannot be prosecuted for illegal propaganda in Spain" (315–16). In authoritarian regimes, "the equilibrium of forces on which limited pluralism is based" constrains the level of repression (316). Repression is further minimized by

the presence in the elite of men who have held power under states of law, and are themselves lawyers or, if military, they share at least the military conceptions of law; legalism may not inhibit the repression of the State's enemies, but it does lead to certain procedural rules, to an emphasis on actions rather than intentions.

Thus, whereas in totalitarian regimes the police persecuted "potential opponents" of the regime, Franco's police harassed only "actual" opponents (317).

Linz attributed the stability of Franco's regime to its "identification with the basic values of the society," more than its suppression of opposition. The population "obeys [Franco] out of a mixture of habit and self-interest, either characterizing the political culture of passive subjects or the parochial" (323–24). As for opposition groups, in many developing countries they are not "constructive" in the sense that "they do not understand the distinction between opposition and secession" (339).

I would surmise, [Linz wrote] that Franco . . . would fully agree with these arguments [about the nonconstructive nature of opposition]. And in the case of Spain, one cannot deny a certain legitimacy to the argument if one considers the behavior of a large part of the Socialist party in the opposition during the October days of 1934, or that of Companys, the head of the Generalitat of Catalonia during those days, or the activities of the Basques nationalists, or those of the extreme Right opposition to the Republic. The distinction between opposition to the government, the regime and even the state, was certainly not clear to many Spaniards (339).

Linz thus indirectly accepted the claims of Franco and other dictators that national unity could only be maintained by limiting the scope of partisan democratic politics.

Linz's portrayal of Franco's Spain paralleled earlier accounts of Mussolini's Italy in several respects. His discounting of the claims of Franco's exiled opponents resembled Ogg's suggestion that the Italian émigrés' charges were exaggerated, as well as Herbert Schneider's indifference to the émigrés' views. Linz's description of the mellowing of Franco's regime ("Staffing the system with officers and civil servants, rather than the 'old shirts' of street fighting days contributes to the growth of legalism" [320]) paralleled Schneider's claim that Mussolini's regime was "rapidly shifting" away from the *fasci* and the "illegalism" of its past. It also echoed Lasswell's account of the de-fascization and professionalization of the Italian bureaucracy. Linz's depiction of the political culture of semi-developed societies as "passive subject" was similar to Henry Spencer's depiction of Italian national psychology, as was Linz's insinuation that such culture comported with authoritarian rule. And Linz's negative depiction of the Spanish opposition echoed accounts that placed partial blame for Mussolini's dictatorship on the opposition.

If Linz's primary goal was to magnify the distinction between totalitarian regimes and "authoritarian" Spain, the thrust of Charles Anderson's work on Spanish political economy (1970) was to minimize the difference between Spain and democratic Western Europe. Anderson, of the University of Wis-

consin, described the Spanish economic "miracle" of the 1960s very favorably, noting that Spain's "economic leadership meets the pragmatic test: it worked" (237). Under Franco, "Spain apparently has made good at the task which has singularly engaged the efforts of all Western nations in the postwar period, the generation of sustained economic growth and development" (5). Writing at the high tide of Keynesianism, Anderson proposed that in the era of Keynesian capitalism

> it may be that the paraphernalia of liberal democratic politics is not . . . particularly pertinent to economic decision-making. Parliaments, in general, no longer have more than a residual role in economic choice . . . The center of gravity in the conduct of economic affairs has shifted from political authorities to central banks, planning agencies and the economic ministries (8).

The spectacular economic growth of authoritarian Spain confirmed, for Anderson, this proposition. He noted that the economic role of western European parliaments was "not totally incomparable" to the role of the *cortes* (82), and that "the participatory processes of planning were more vital in Spain than in France" (182). "The similarities between the policy process in Spain and the rest of the Western world," Anderson inferred, "were not due to the fact that Spain was less authoritarian than conventionally believed, but that the Western democracies were more so" (244).

Anderson concluded with the statement that "the technical problems of policy-making apparently still involve the eternal issue of the appropriate balance between liberty and authority in any political order" (250). Indeed there was little in the book to suggest that Franco's Spain did not strike such an "appropriate balance," at least not in comparison to the Western democracies.

Peronism, Getulisme, Corporatism

Juan Linz was ambivalent about the "authoritarian" status of Peron's dictatorship, which he depicted as "the most interesting case of a shift toward a more totalitarian conception from what was originally a military dictatorship" (1964:337). The task of rehabilitating the reputation of Peronism was thus left to Jeane Kirkpatrick (1971) of Georgetown University. Kirkpatrick, a member of a circle of liberal anticommunist political scientists close to Hubert Humphrey and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations in the 1980s (Ehrman 1995:117), portrayed Peron's regime as a nonrevolutionary "authoritarian" alternative to totalitarian communism. Peron may have been a demagogue or fascist, but

> he is also the man who presided over the participatory revolution in Argentinean politics. It was he who perceived the masses of barely literate but recently uprooted poor on the doorstep of the political system and invited them in. If he did not exactly prepare a place for them, he nonetheless made them feel welcome. And if he did not enter with them, his wife Evita did, and his own entrance was made more dramatic, more triumphal, and more definitive and his tenure in office extended by their accompaniment (30).

Kirkpatrick described Eva Peron as "an impressively dynamic, ambitious, beautiful and talented woman" whose relationship with the masses "was based more on mutual identification than on rhetoric. Her precise role in the political structure of Peronist Argentina will never be known, but it is frequently observed that problems multiplied after her death" (31).

Kirkpatrick acknowledged that Juan Peron censored the press, purged the judiciary, and jailed thousands of political prisoners. Yet she insisted that the regime was not totalitarian since "Peron did not destroy all opposition" (40).

The focus of Kirkpatrick's book was actually broader than Peronism, as she set out to investigate "the psychocultural aspects of the mass base of Argentinean society" (4). Kirkpatrick quoted uncritically unflattering accounts of the Argentine national character as politically "passive." "The characterization of the Argentine national character . . . will have a familiar ring for students of Mediterranean cultures generally. Lack of community is a recurrent theme in the literature on Latin cultures. In these cultures, family is often described as the only unit whose members are united by trust, affection, and empathy . . . Interpersonal relations outside the family are said to be dominated by mutual suspicion and distrust" (118–19). Kirkpatrick's own survey of Argentine opinion "confirm[ed] the existence of high levels of mutual distrust, of cynicism about government, and of lack of agreement about the desirable form of political organization" (231).

The chief message of the book (later echoed in Kirkpatrick's famous 1979 article) was that Anglo-American democracy was not natural to "Mediterranean-style" cultures, and that in Argentina democracy was a sham even when its forms were observed. While the "Anglo-Saxon tradition predisposes us to think of compromise as the heart of the political process and conflict resolution as the core political skill," other cultures place a high value on "rectitude and deference," thus rendering political compromise "exceedingly difficult" (232–33). The book concluded with the observation that "The tendency of Argentina to gravitate repeatedly toward and acquiesce in autocracy might be explained by the relatively low requirements of autocracy for compromise, conciliation, and cooperation" (233).

Kirkpatrick's observation that in Latin cultures the family is "the only unit whose members are united by trust, affection and empathy" closely resembled Henry Spencer's (1932:15) claim that Italian "family life is a bright spot. It is founded on affection rather than interest or legal bonds." Kirkpatrick's depiction of Argentine "passiveness" and lack of civic spirit mirrored Spencer's (19) depiction of the Italians as "socially indifferent" and "passive subjects rather than active citizens." And her view that Argentine political culture did not meet the high standards required for Anglo-Saxon democracy echoed Frederic Ogg's claim that the Italians were "ill-prepared by experience . . . and temperament" to properly exercise Anglo-Saxon parliamentarism.

The notion that the political culture of certain societies is "familist," and

hence inauspicious to liberal democracy, was applied to Brazil by Philippe Schmitter (1971) of the University of Chicago. Schmitter argued that Getulio Vargas's *Estado Novo* laid the foundation for an authoritarian corporatist political *sistema* that outlived Vargas himself, and that persisted even when the Brazilian government was formally democratic. This sistema "can be credited with" the administrative, economic, and legal unification of Brazil, with Brazil's industrialization, and with "the promulgation and partial enforcement of an extensive set of social welfare policies. Even if none of these transformations resulted 'from below,' they form quite a list of accomplishments" (389).

Schmitter criticized scholars who theorized that modernization led to either democratization or totalitarian revolution, and he maintained that Brazil epitomized a third—authoritarian, corporatist—path to modernization (386–92). The prospects of liberal democracy (or totalitarianism) in Brazil were remote, in large part because the authoritarian system had "deep roots in the country's political culture" (392).

To portray Brazil's political culture, Schmitter drew heavily on the writings of F. J. de Oliveira Vianna, an ideologue of Vargas's corporatist dictatorship (117). Schmitter acknowledged that "Oliveira Vianna's political oeuvre is not studied today, perhaps because of his association with racist and corporatist thought in the 1920s and 1930s" (49). Nevertheless Schmitter chose to rehabilitate Oliveira Vianna's reputation because "more clearly and insistently than any other Brazilian social thinker [he] has stressed that the extraordinary continuity of the Brazilian political culture . . . depended upon the persistent role of the major, almost unchallenged agent of attitudinal socialization, the family" (50). Given the "rigidly patriarchal and authoritarian" structure of the Brazilian family, "it is no wonder that numerous observers found the Brazilians humble, obedient, and easy to govern" (55). Brazilians are socialized by their families into a "faith that one's leaders will exercise their power for one's benefit, but without one's participation, and that such an exercise will be personal" (56). This cultural legacy is so powerful that "Brazil has had difficulty replacing affective, familistic particularism with a distinctive set of universalistic, rational orientations toward the political process" (53). In sum, Schmitter endorsed the view, articulated by a Vargas apologist, that because of the authoritarian character of their families, Brazilians essentially feel at home in an authoritarian, paternalistic political system.

In an influential article published in a special issue of the *Review of Politics* on the "new corporatism," Schmitter (1974) repudiated his earlier argument that authoritarian corporatism had deep roots in Brazilian, or, more broadly, Latin American culture.[10] He wrote that "Those who advocated corporatism in the Iberian and Latin American areas unabashedly and unashamedly imported

[10] The special issue was reprinted as Pike and Stritch (1974). Page numbers below refer to this volume.

their ideas from abroad" (90). Based on the corporatist theory of Mihail Manoilesco—a pro-fascist Romanian thinker of the interwar period—Schmitter constructed an ideal type of dictatorial "state corporatism," and he argued (reversing his earlier view) that the cases of Spain, Portugal, Brazil, and other Latin American corporatist dictatorships conform to this ideal type as much as the "defunct" cases of fascist Italy, Petainist France, Nazi Germany, and Austria under Dolfuss (104).

But the other contributors to the volume on the "new corporatism" disagreed with Schmitter's claim that Iberic-Latin corporatism and European fascist corporatism were cut of the same cloth. Fredrick Pike (1974), the volume's co-editor, insisted that corporatism, and the paternalism it entails, were indigenous to Hispanic culture. Pike accepted the claim of Franco's apologists that the Spanish masses were not ready to escape their dependence upon a paternalistic government: "The Spanish lower classes seem little concerned with demanding a voice in national decision-making processes, so long as those in power afford them security through state paternalism, and so long as the power wielders make purchasing power available to them" (185–86. Compare this statement to Henry Spencer's statement that the Italians were "unwilling to disturb any regime, democratic or despotic, if only 'si lavora e si mangia.'"). The Spanish elite indeed "has been amazingly successful in channeling more money into the hands of the Spanish masses," and it has pampered the masses "with a wide coverage of paternalistic protection." In terms rather sympathetic to Franco's regime, Pike described how "Spain scored spectacular gains in capitalist development and simultaneously strengthened the paternalism on which an elitist, nonliberal, corporate social structure depended" (178). He concluded that "Spain's syndicalist or corporatist system is functioning fairly well as a vital mechanism in bestowing state paternalism upon the laboring classes" (201–2).

Pike noted approvingly that several Latin American regimes, including the Pinochet-led junta in Chile, were following Franco's developmental model:

> an increasing number of Latin American republics could conceivably find the means for accomplishing the goal toward which Spain's technocratic elite have, with remarkable short term success, devoted their efforts during the past two decades: accommodation between modern times and the essential social gestures of the traditional, elitist, two-culture corporate society. . . . Spaniards can look with satisfaction upon the members of their *raza* . . . in the New World, for Spanish Americans seem to have resisted the lure of Anglo-American models and to have maintained their cultural heritage intact by eschewing liberal inorganic democracy based on society-wide diffusion of individualism. In this situation Spaniards can perhaps find affirmation of their conventional wisdom that liberalism was never more than a passing sickness (207–8).

Pike himself all but endorsed the view that liberalism was a "passing sickness." He wrote that the doubts expressed in the early 1970s about the viability of Western democracy

> contribute to the tolerance with which North Americans have quite recently begun to view the nonliberal ways of Spanish Americans. For years, and even centuries, members of the more highly developed Western world . . . have been smugly predicting that eventually Spaniards as a whole would become liberal enough to earn the rights of a closer association with polite international society. Today traditionalist Spaniards may with some justification be thinking that eventually the rest of the world will become illiberal enough to merit acceptance by them and by the American members of their *raza* (208–9).

In sum, Fredrick Pike not only proposed that authoritarian Spain provided a viable model for developing societies; he suggested that Franco's illiberal corporatism offered a model from which even the United States had something to learn.

Howard Wiarda—a prolific Latin Americanist from the University of Massachusetts—was another contributor to the "New Corporatism" volume who, contra Schmitter, argued that authoritarian corporatism was "natural" to the Iberic-Latin world, and that it had little affinity with Italian fascism (Wiarda 1974). In the early 1960s, Wiarda supported the Kennedy administration's Alliance for Progress, which promoted U.S.-style liberal democracy in Latin America. But in 1964–65 Wiarda encountered the darker side of American liberalism as he witnessed the invasion of the Dominican Republic, where he was researching his dissertation. As a result of this personal experience, later reinforced by the events of Vietnam and Watergate, Wiarda became disillusioned with American liberalism and turned into a fervent critic of the notion that the American liberal-pluralist model was applicable to other parts of the world, especially Latin America and the Iberian Peninsula (Wiarda 1981: 3–10).

Wiarda's argument against the universality of liberal democracy was cultural. In a book partly based on his dissertation research, he (1969) described the Dominican political culture as an exaggerated version of Latin American culture. He wrote that "the Dominicans by and large do not have the kind of ambitious, innovational, risk-taking personalities found in other cultures" (85). To them, "personal integrity is more important than abstract rights and institutions, and personal honor and dignity tend to take priority over group responsibility" (82–83). Furthermore, "The pragmatic compromise, the workable solution, the idea of 'getting it done' are not as highly valued in Dominican society as they are in the Anglo-American culture" (84).

Although Wiarda's politics differed markedly from Jeane Kirkpatrick's—she was a staunch liberal anticommunist, whereas he became a critic of American liberalism—the latter claim is strikingly similar to Kirkpatrick's argument (1971:232–32) that Mediterranean-style cultures lacked "the Anglo-Saxon tradition [which] predisposes us to think of compromise as the heart of the political process." Kirkpatrick concluded that the Latin emphasis on deference might explain "the tendency of Argentina to gravitate repeatedly toward

and acquiesce in autocracy," and Wiarda reached a similar conclusion regarding the Dominican Republic:

> In this [cultural] context, the building of a democratic society—at least on the British or U.S. model—would be most difficult. Few of the commonly accepted ingredients of democracy . . . are present. It may therefore be easier to understand why the country has vacillated between periods of extreme tyranny and extreme instability. (88)

In subsequent studies Wiarda not only maintained that Iberic-Latin authoritarian regimes should not be judged by American liberal standards, he further argued that the liberal United States had as much to learn from corporatist Iberia and Latin America as the other way around. These themes were articulated, for example, in Wiarda's 1977 study of the Salazar dictatorship in Portugal, a regime he dubbed a corporatist "experiment" (xi, 8) and described as the "'purest' of the Iberic-Latin corporative systems" (6).

> A case can be made that, in comparison with both the liberal and the socialist alternatives, a number of the Iberic-Latin systems, founded upon corporatist principles, come out not altogether badly on a variety of indices of participation, social justice and the management of the twentieth century change process . . . Perhaps terms like *participation* and even *democratization* mean different things in different cultural contexts, and maybe the indices of electoral participation used by North American social scientists are themselves culture bound. Moreover, given the growing realization that the United States has not coped very well with, much less solved, its fundamental problems of poverty, racism, unemployment, alienation, inadequate human services and the like, it may be that the Iberic-Latin model and practice of dealing with some of these same issues contain lessons from which we can learn (10; emphases original).

Iberic-Latin societies such as Portugal have modernized, Wiarda suggested, "without sacrificing the sense of community, personalism, moral values and national purpose which we [Americans] seem to have lost." Their "adapting to modernization without being overwhelmed by it may offer instruction concerning our own developmental dilemmas and institutional malaise" (10–11).

I have already noted that scholars who uncritically portrayed fascist Italy fell into two categories. One group, exemplified by Henry Spencer, viewed fascism as appropriate for backward Italy, yet an irrelevant model for America. Other scholars, exemplified by Herbert Schneider, were intrigued by the possibility of borrowing certain fascist institutions or methods for the purpose of alleviating the ailments they diagnosed in liberal America. If Jeane Kirkpatrick's view of Argentina and Philippe Schmitter's (1971) analysis of Brazil echoed the first of these two views, the attitudes articulated by Fredrick Pike and especially Howard Wiarda were more analogous to the latter. Schneider belonged to a generation whose faith in American liberalism was shaken by World War I, when the Wilson administration used force and repressed dissent in the name of democracy. The American invasions of the Dominican Republic and Vietnam—also in the name of democracy—were to Wiarda's generation what the Great War was to Schneider's: a catalyst for disenchantment with liberalism.

Many members of both generations of disenchanted intellectuals swung toward revolutionary socialism, and some of them consequently idealized the brutal regimes of Stalin or Mao (Hollander 1981; Caute 1988). But in both periods there were also disenchanted intellectuals like Schneider and Wiarda, who sought a third, corporatist, path between liberal individualism and socialist collectivism, and who consequently were "soft" on certain unpleasant regimes that purported to take such a path. Schneider (1927: 201) declared that "The 'Fascist state' is being enlarged into the 'corporate state,'" and he found in Mussolini's corporate state the sense of community and solidarity that he felt was sorely missing in individualistic America. Five decades later, Wiarda similarly claimed that Iberic-Latin dictatorships were more corporatist than fascist, and that America's "institutional malaise" might be alleviated by learning how these regimes modernized "without sacrificing the sense of community, personalism, moral values and national purpose which we seem to have lost" (Wiarda 1977, 10).

CONCLUSION

In the 1920s and 1930s—against the backdrop of the Great War's propaganda experience, a wave of democratic reversals, and the Great Depression—wide circles within American political science were permeated by an intellectual mood that entailed doubts about the workability and universality of democracy, displeasure with the atomism of American society, and a sentiment favoring governmental intervention to foster social harmony. This mood combined with a belief in the quiescent character of the Italian people to produce a climate in which the expression of forgiving attitudes toward Italy's fascist dictatorship was an acceptable (though not universal) practice. A number of political scientists, including recipients of the discipline's highest honors, discounted or rationalized fascist repression and praised various fascist achievements. The uncritical attitudes of some of these scholars stemmed from a belief that parliamentary democracy was alien to the Italian temperament, and that Mussolini's dictatorship was a viable modernizing force for undeveloped Italy. Other scholars were uncritical because they were fascinated with certain fascist institutions—especially the corporate state—or methods (e.g., of civic education), and they entertained the possibility of importing such practices, modified to fit American conditions. None of these political scientists supported the installation of a fascist dictatorship in the United States. Rather, the point is that they either condoned fascist dictatorship as appropriate for Italy, or wished to borrow what they regarded as positive aspects of fascism, not its less pleasant features.

In the 1960s and 1970s—against the backdrop of Vietnam, Watergate, and another wave of democratic reversals—certain segments of the political science profession were again swept by a mood of pessimism about the prospects of democracy, disenchantment with liberal pluralism, and a yearning for a

greater role for the state in the harmonization of social group relations. These intellectual currents combined with a lingering view of "Mediterranean" people as socially "passive" to produce a climate that permitted a rehabilitation of corporatist dictatorships previously associated with fascism: Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal, Peron's Argentina, and Vargas's Brazil. In this essay, I did not attempt to directly compare these regimes to Mussolini's dictatorship, but rather to establish that political scientists' portrayals of these regimes were comparable to earlier portrayals of fascist Italy. In the 1960s and 1970s a number of prominent political scientists repeated their predecessors' errors, highlighting the achievements of authoritarian corporatist regimes while glossing over their less pleasant aspects. The uncritical attitude of some of these scholars reflected a belief that Latin people lacked the cultural prerequisites for the successful practice of liberal democracy, and that authoritarian corporatism was a viable path to modernization in Latin America. Other scholars were uncritical because they thought that Iberic-Latin corporatist institutions preserved a sense of community and national purpose—values that Americans should recover if they wished to cure America's institutional malaise. None of the political scientists who expressed uncritical views of Iberian or Latin American authoritarian regimes supported the installation of a dictatorship in the United States. Like their predecessors, they either condoned authoritarian dictatorship as appropriate for Iberic-Latin societies alone, or wished to borrow what they viewed as positive values associated with Iberic-Latin authoritarianism, not the harsher features of these regimes.

This essay focused on political scientists not because their attitudes were intrinsically more important than the attitudes of other Americans, but because of my own affiliation with the political science profession, and my dissatisfaction with the paucity of historical consciousness and self-reflection in the discipline. Had political scientists critically examined their past views of fascism, perhaps they would have been more circumspect in their later portrayal of Iberian and Latin American dictatorships. Should this essay inspire some political scientists to take a greater interest in, and reflect more critically about their discipline's past, it will have performed a useful service.

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